摘要
随着可持续发展进程深化,提高城市居民参与生活垃圾源头分类的效率、参与意愿以及减少不合规垃圾分类行为的重要性越发凸显。应用两阶段Stackelberg动态博弈理论模型重点探讨占据主导地位的湿垃圾生物降解处理厂与居民之间的利益博弈与分配以及建立基于惩罚机制的博弈模型来减少居民不合规垃圾分类的行为。结果表明:奖惩机制的设立可以有效提高城市居民参与垃圾分类的意愿与效率,并减少不合规垃圾分类行为的产生,提供资源回收再利用的效率。
With the deepening of sustainable development process,the importance of improving the efficiency,willingness and reducing irregular waste classification behavior of urban residents is becoming more and more prominent.In this paper,the two-stage Stackelberg dynamic game theory model is applied to discuss the benefit game and distribution between the dominant wet waste biodegradation treatment plant and residents,as well as the establishment of a game model based on penalty mechanism to reduce the irregular waste classification behavior of residents.The results show that the incentive and punishment mechanism can effectively improve the willingness and efficiency of urban residents to participate in garbage classification,and reduce the occurrence of irregular garbage classification behavior.
作者
周陈园
浦悦
ZHOU Chen-yuan;PU Yue(School of Management,Shanghai University of Engineering Science,Shanghai 201620,China)
出处
《物流工程与管理》
2020年第8期159-162,共4页
Logistics Engineering and Management
基金
上海市研究生科研创新项目“城市垃圾资源化与减量化对策研究”(项目编号:19KY0307)。
关键词
湿垃圾
垃圾分类
两阶段博弈
奖惩机制
wet garbage
garbage classification
two-stage game
reward and punishment mechanism
