摘要
针对政府激励、科技资源平台创新、小微企业参与平台创新的博弈问题,构建小微企业、平台与政府三方演化博弈模型,考虑政府激励的动态性,分析影响各参与主体行为策略演化路径的因素。研究发现,增加政府监管制度供给、实施平台动态考核、适度控制奖励支付总额及设计合理的奖励衰减机制;督促平台提供创新性服务、打造良好平台生态;实施有利于降低小微企业参与平台创新的成本,以及增加其不参与时的潜在损失的措施等等,能增加三方收益,是促进科技资源平台与小微企业创新行为的有效方法。
For gambling problem in activities of government incentives,science and technology resources platform innovation and smallµ enterprises participation of innovation platform,the evolutionary game model with the dynamic incentives of government between small and micro business,resources platform,and government was established.Then factors affecting the evolutionary paths when the participants take different behavioral strategies were analyzed.The results show that increasing the institutional supply of government supervision,carrying out the dynamic assessments on platform,taking moderate reward payment and decay measures can increase excess profits,and thus are effective methods to improve the innovation behaviors of both the platform and firm.And supervising the effort of platform in innovating service,building good platform ecology,and taking measures contributing to decrease firm′s costs and increase their potential loss when not involved are also effective methods.
作者
李文鹣
张洋
王涵
陆文茜
郭本海
LI Wenjian;ZHANG Yang;WANG Han;LU Wenqian;GUO Benhai(School of Management,Jiangsu University,Jiangsu 212013,China;School of Economics and Management,China Jiliang University,Hangzhou 310018,China)
出处
《工业工程与管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2020年第2期92-100,共9页
Industrial Engineering and Management
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71673119,71573120)
江苏省社会科学基金项目(15GLB008)
教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目(18YJA630056)。
关键词
科技资源共享
平台创新
动态激励
演化博弈
science and technology resources sharing
platform innovation
dynamic incentive
evolutionary game
