摘要
基于中央政府、地方政府及农民的互动视角,采用博弈分析方法,系统考察了我国农村人居环境污染的逻辑机制。研究发现:我国农村人居环境污染的根源在于规制失灵;农村人居环境公共资源的“公地悲剧”不是必然现象,可以在农民之间建立一种自实施的自治机制,避免导致“公地悲剧”;由于利益目标的差异,中央政府与地方政府之间的激励问题、地方政府与农户之间的博弈行为,导致了农村人居环境规制失灵。研究启示是,制度的建立健全是农村人居环境治理顺利推进的保障,更将有利于乡村振兴战略的实施以及我国农村的可持续发展。
Based on the interactive perspective of central government,local government and rural citizens,this paper uses game analysis method to systematically investigate the logical mechanism of rural residential environment pollution in China.It is found that the source of pollution of rural residential environment in China lies in the failure of regulation.The phenomenon of the“tragedy of the Commons”of the public environmental resources in rural residential areas is not inevitable.A self-executing mechanism can be established among the peasants to avoid the“tragedy of the Commons”.Due to the differences of interest goals,there is an incentive problem between central government and local government and a game behavior between local government and peasant household,which lead to the failure of regulation of rural human settlements.The study implication of this paper is that the establishment and perfection of the system is the guarantee for the smooth progress of rural residential environment governance,and will be beneficial to the implementation of rural revitalization strategy and the sustainable development of China’s rural areas.
作者
廖卫东
刘淼
LIAO Weidong;LIU Miao(School of Economics,Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics,Nanchang Jiangxi 330013,China)
出处
《生态经济》
北大核心
2020年第5期194-199,共6页
Ecological Economy
基金
国家自然科学基金项目“生态产业链、利益主体异质性与畜禽污染治理:机理与制度设计”(716731123)。
关键词
农村人居环境污染
规制失灵
博弈分析
激励相容
pollution of rural residential environment
regulation failure
game analysis
incentive compatibility
