摘要
回应哈金的“消去主义”,是当代自然种类理论研究的一个难题。克里普克通过哲学的语义分析导出一种“类本质主义”,引领出一个集中于解释分类自然性的自然种类理论研究趋势。由“类本质主义”到“稳定性质簇说”,相关探讨接受语言哲学“遵从世界”的思维,并随之接受一个“人-自然”式的二元世界结构预设。“稳定性质簇说”基于“集团稳定性”解释自然种类,该解释具有一定的优势,但是它主要从认识论的角度综合“自我平衡性质簇说”和“非规则的稳定性”,没有质疑已有研究的本体论基础,因此在本体论取向方面犹豫不决。“稳定性质簇说”重视本体论实践,但是需要一种本体论观念的修正。综合关于自然种类的哲学语义学、认识论和形而上学研究,有可能给出对于哈金“消去主义”的进一步回应。
Responding to Hacking’s“eliminatism”is a difficult problem for contemporary theoretical studies of natural kinds.Kripke entailed his“kind essentialism”through philosophical semantic analysis,leading a trend of natural kind studies which focused on explaining naturalness of classifications.From“kind essentialism”to“stable property cluster account”,the related discussions accept the idea of“deferring to the world”in philosophy of language,and thus presuppose a dualistic world structure which consists of man and nature.“Stable property cluster account”explains natural kinds in terms of“cliquish stability”.The explanation has certain advantages.However,the account recombines“homeostatic property cluster account”with“non-nomic stability”in an epistemological way.It inherits ontological basis from former theories,and thus becomes indecisive in its ontological orientation.“Stable property cluster account”speaks highly of ontological practice,but it needs a revision of ontological concepts.To give further responses to Hacking’s“eliminatism”,it is necessary to give a systematical consideration of studies of natural kinds in philosophical semantics,epistemology and metaphysics.
作者
张存建
ZHANG Cun-jian(School of Philosophy and Public Administration,Jiangsu Normal University,Xuzhou Jiangsu 221116,China)
出处
《科学技术哲学研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2020年第2期45-50,共6页
Studies in Philosophy of Science and Technology
基金
国家社科基金项目“信息互动的逻辑、认知与计算研究”(14ZDB016)
江苏省高校哲学社会科学研究基金项目“自然种类的形而上学研究”(2018SJA0948)。
关键词
自然种类
稳定性质簇
斯莱特
例示稳定性
集团稳定性
natural kinds
stable property cluster
Slater
instance stability
cliquish stability
