摘要
基于地方官员任期与财政补贴视角,构建理论模型,利用我国地方政府官员数据与A股上市公司数据进行实证研究。结果表明:地方官员在任期前期会减少对辖区内企业的补贴力度,任期中后期会增加财政补贴规模。地方官员上任初期,出于谨慎动机,需要先了解当地企业的情况再作出补贴决策,因此会暂时减少财政补贴。这一谨慎性主要表现在非本地晋升和晋升激励程度小的官员样本中。减少财政补贴的对象主要是民营企业和非重点补贴行业企业。
Based on the perspective of the tenure of local officials and fiscal subsidies, this paper constructs a theoretical model, and uses the data of local government officials and A-share listed companies to conduct empirical research. The results show that the local officials will reduce the subsidy to the enterprises in their jurisdiction in the early term, and increase the scale of financial subsidy in the middle and late term. In the early days of taking office,local officials need to know the situation of local enterprises before making subsidy decisions, so they will temporarily reduce financial subsidies.This caution is mainly reflected in the sample of non local promotion and promotion of officials with small incentive level.The main objects of reducing financial subsidies are private enterprises and non key subsidy industry enterprises.
作者
吉黎
JI Li(School of Management,University of Shanghai for Science and Technology,Shanghai 200093,China)
出处
《经济与管理》
CSSCI
2020年第2期58-65,共8页
Economy and Management
基金
国家社会科学青年基金项目(18CJL022)
教育部人文社会科学基金青年项目(16YJC790036)。
关键词
财政补贴
政策不确定性
官员任期
谨慎动机
fiscal subsidy
policy uncertainty
local officials’ tenure
cautious motivation
