摘要
信息共享是促进网信军民融合发展的关键因素。基于网信军民融合的信息共享现状,运用演化博弈理论,建立信息共享的博弈模型,然后引入不同类型的奖惩机制进行对比分析。结果表明:军民双方具有共享价值的信息总量、信息共享产生的协同效用及风险直接影响系统的信息共享效果;对“只引入风险补贴”与“风险补贴+惩罚”两种奖惩机制对比分析,发现后者对信息共享行为更有促进作用;当政府的风险补贴能够弥补风险成本对协同效用的负作用时,军民双方均愿意采取信息共享策略。
Information sharing is a key factor in promoting the development of internet information military-civilian integration. Based on the status quo of information sharing between internet information military-civilian integration, using evolutionary game theory to establish a game model of information sharing, and finally introducing different types of reward and punishment mechanisms for comparative analysis. The results show that the total amount of information shared by both the military and the civilian, the synergistic effect and risk caused by information sharing directly affect the information sharing effect of the system;while comparing the two reward and punishment mechanisms of “only introducing risk subsidy” and “risk subsidy + punishment”, it is found that the latter has a more promoting effect on information sharing behavior;when the government’s risk subsidy can compensate for the negative effect of risk cost on synergy, both the military and the civilian are willing to adopt an information sharing strategy.
作者
徐刚
何岚
石良娟
何文刚
XU Gang;HE Lan;SHI Liangjuan;HE Wengang(School of Management, Chongqing University of Technology, Chongqing 400054, China)
出处
《重庆理工大学学报（社会科学）》
CAS
2019年第7期66-74,共9页
Journal of Chongqing University of Technology（Social Science）
基金
企事业单位委托技术开发项目“重庆市军民融合发展战略研究”(2018-ZD-CQ-06)
重庆市科委决策咨询与管理创新一般项目“重庆市兵器工业军民融合技术创新模式与机制研究”(cstc2018jsyj-zdcxX0005)
关键词
网信军民融合
信息共享
演化博弈
军工企业
民营企业
information military-civilian integration
information sharing
evolutionary game
military industrial enterprises
private enterprises
