摘要
在供应链弹性契约的约束下,要让供应链合作的双方有实现信息共享的积极性,就必须让双方在信息共享的条件下获取的利益至少不低于在未实现信息共享下的所获得的利益,这样才能实现双方利益的帕累托改善,也才能激励下游企业积极向上游企业共享需求信息,这必然要依赖于供应链弹性契约的科学设计。文章通过确定一个弹性数量契约来分析供应链上的合作双方在信息共享与信息不共享的条件下对双方运作绩效的改进,并考虑了在信息显示成本较大的情况下,对供应链中合作的双方进行信息显示成本分担的供应链弹性契约设计,从而获取满意或最优的契约参数。
Under the Obligation of the Supply Chain Flexibility Contract, if both collaborative parties in the supply chain have an enthusiasm for achieving information sharing, the benefits which both parties gain after achieving information sharing will not less than that before achieving infor- mation sharing. Thus Pareto improvement of the benefits of both parties will come true, and the down enterprise will he induced actively to share in- formation to the upstream enterprise. It cannot but depend on the scientific design of supply chain flexibility contract. The paper analyzes the im- provement of the performance of both collaborative parties in the supply chain after achieving information sharing and hefore achieving information sharing by designing an flexibility contract. And it considers the condition which has a larger information revealing cost, and thereby carries through supply chain flexibility contract design which shares in the information revealing cost for both collaborative parties in the supply chain, so it can get satisfactory or optimal contract parameters.
出处
《当代经济管理》
2010年第1期23-28,共6页
Contemporary Economic Management
关键词
供应链
弹性契约
信息共享
激励
supply chain
flexibility contract
information sharing
incentive
