摘要
良好的专利授权和确权质量是知识产权保护的基石,而专利授权协议又是知识产权转化为现实生产力的关键。本文针对由专利持有企业、品牌企业及OEM厂商组成的系统,考虑不同企业之间存在需求信息不对称及企业社会责任承担,构建了专利授权和生产外包等两阶段博弈模型,分析了最优专利授权合同设计和需求信息披露策略及企业社会责任的价值。研究结果表明,针对不同市场条件,专利持有企业会策略性地设计固定专利授权费的专利授权合同或者"单位产品销售提成+固定专利授权费"的专利授权合同;品牌企业承担的社会责任会促使其实施低价策略,有利于提升产品需求和消费者剩余;在一定条件下,品牌企业愿意披露其私有的市场需求信息,与专利持有企业共享整个系统利润。本研究结论可为专利提供商专利授权合同设计、品牌企业生产外包决策提供一定指导与借鉴。
Good quality of patent licensing and authorization agreements is the foundation for the protection of intellectual property rights, and patent authorization agreement is the key to transform intellectual property into realistic productivity. Considering a system consisting of a patent owner, a branded manufacturer and an original equipment manufacturer(OEM), we investigate a license contract and a production outsourcing strategy in a completely monopolized market in the presence of asymmetric information and corporate social responsibility. The patent owner wants to design a license contract to charge a branded manufacturer for the right to use the patented technology, but the branded manufacturer has private demand information, and the branded manufacturer purchases its goods from the OEM. We establish a two-stage game model considering demand information asymmetry existing among different enterprises, and corporate social responsibilities. In the first stage, the patent owner licenses its technology to the branded manufacturer. After that, the branded manufacturer outsources its production to the OEM in the second stage. A patent license agreement which meets participation constraints and incentive compatibility constraints is proposed in this paper to screen the market demand information from the view point of the patent owner. On this basis, we analyze the optimal design of the patent license agreement, the optimal demand information disclosure strategy, and the effects of the corporate social responsibility on equilibrium outcomes. The results show that, when market demand is relatively small, the optimal licensing contract is a fixed-fee licensing contract;otherwise, the optimal licensing contract is a two-part tariff licensing contract. Moreover, when focusing on the corporate social responsibility, the branded manufacturer reduces the price of products to meet consumer demand. In conclusion, the existence of corporate social responsibility leads to the change of the supply chain’s enterprises’ profit
作者
金亮
郑本荣
胡浔
Jin Liang;Zheng Benrong;Hu Xun(Research Center of the Central China for Economic and Social Development, Nanchang University;School of Economics and Management, Nanchang University;College of Economics & Management, Huazhong Agriculture University)
出处
《南开管理评论》
CSSCI
北大核心
2019年第3期40-53,共14页
Nankai Business Review
基金
教育部人文社科基金项目(19YJC630067、19YJC630229)
江西省高校人文社会科学重点研究基地项目(JD18014)资助
关键词
专利授权
生产外包
企业社会责任
信息披露
Patent Licensing
Production Outsourcing
Corporate Social Responsibility
Information Disclosure
