摘要
考虑物流服务供应链自身特质,在探讨跨链物流服务供应链单链内部企业间存在的合作关系和链际间集成商存在的跨链竞合协调机制基础上,将跨链网络内部运作失效分为物流服务集成商服务能力不足和集成能力缺失两种类型,构建以物流服务集成商跨链为基础的两级物流服务供应链能力应急互补合作模型。采用分散决策、集中决策及收益共享契约模型给出各状态最优收益策略,同时以增量分配收益共享契约求得集中决策时最优收益状态,进一步以数值仿真分析跨链物流服务供应链系统各决策模式收益结构,验证收益共享契约策略优越性。结果表明:跨链物流服务供应链系统的集中决策模式最优订购值与最优收益大于分散决策最优状态,集中决策使跨链系统达到整体最优;基于增量分配的收益共享契约机制能够有效协调跨链物流服务供应链系统的分散决策模式,达到集中决策状态的最优收益值;运作风险阶段较高的收益共享系数能够使物流服务集成商在跨链能力系统内获得更多收益,收益共享机制能将跨链系统整体收益提升至集中决策水平,说明跨链收益共享机制能够明显刺激系统内交易活跃程度。
Considering the characteristics of logistics service supplychain, the cooperation relationship between single-chain enterprises ofcross-chain logistics service supply chain and the cross-chaincompetition and coordination mechanism of inter-chain integrator arediscussed. On this basis, the internal operational failure of cross-chain network is divided into 2 types: service capability shortage oflogistics service integrator, and lack of integration capability, and a2-stage logistics service supply chain capability emergencycomplementary cooperation model based on integrator’s cross-chain isconstructed. The decentralized decision-making, the centralizeddecision-making and the revenue-sharing contract models are adopted toderive each optimal return strategy. Meanwhile, the optimal return statewhen obtaining centralized decision-making is solved by shared contractof incremental allocating revenue. Then, numerical simulation is used toanalyze the revenue structure of each decision-making model of cross-chain logistics service supply chain system, and the superiority ofrevenue sharing contract strategy is verified. The result shows that(1)the optimal ordering value and the optimal revenue of centralizeddecision-making mode of cross-chain logistics service supply chainsystem are greater than the optimal state of decentralized decision-making, and centralized decision-making can make cross-chain systemachieve overall optimality;(2) the revenue sharing contract mechanismbased on incremental allocation can effectively coordinate thedecentralized decision-making mode of cross-chain logistics servicesupply chain system, and achieve optimal revenue value in centralizeddecision-making state;(3) the higher revenue sharing factor inoperational risk stage can enable logistics service integrator to obtainmore revenue in cross-chain capability system, and the revenue sharingmechanism can raise the overall revenue of cross-chain system tocentralized decision-making level, indicating that cross-chain revenuesharing mechanism can sig
作者
张广胜
王艳玲
ZHANG Guang-sheng;WANG Yan-ling(Shandong Management University, Jinan Shandong 250357, China)
出处
《公路交通科技》
CAS
CSCD
北大核心
2019年第6期135-143,共9页
Journal of Highway and Transportation Research and Development
基金
国家社会科学重点基金项目(13AJY010)
国家社会科学基金项目(18BJY108)
国家自然科学基金项目(11871434)
国家社会科学青年基金项目(15CJY057)
山东管理学院企业管理创新研究所资助项目(2018B1010)
关键词
物流工程
运作风险
跨链协调
物流服务供应链
收益共享
logistics engineering
operational risk
cross-chaincoordination
logistics service supply chain(LSSC)
revenue sharing
