摘要
目前我国学界普遍将运动式治理理解为某一行动者(国家或是地方政府)追求某一目标(实际绩效或是合法性)而采取的策略。然而,这种视角却无法解释运动式治理常规化、内卷化与协商化所体现出来的逻辑悖论。本文基于多重逻辑的分析框架,认为在目标责任制与属地权威制之下,党委政府、运动式治理的主持部门与配合部门三者有着彼此矛盾的行动逻辑,它们之间的冲突与沟通通过运动式治理过程中的三个阶段(权威授予、权威激励与权威使用)体现出来。运动式治理正是在这三种行动逻辑的交织作用下,不断地被生产与再生产出来。
It is common to consider Campaign-Style Governance as a strategy which shows a linear logic of agents (the state or local governments) and targets (actual performance or legitimacy). However, it can t explain the routinization, the involution and the bargaining relationship of Campaign-Style governance. Based on an analytical framework of multiple logics, this paper suggests that under the target responsibility system and local authoritarian system, the local party committee and government, the host sectors and the cooperating sectors have different and even contradicting logic interacting in three stages respectively. At last, this paper shows how the interplay of the three different logics contributes to the reproduction of Campaign-Style Governance of China.
出处
《社会发展研究》
CSSCI
2019年第1期121-142,244-245,共23页
Journal of Social Development
