摘要
政府委托生产企业进行能力代储,是扩大应急物资供应保障的一种重要途径,提高代储企业的努力水平对有效发挥这一系统的作用具有重要影响。但由于存在信息不对称因素,政府无法完整地观测到企业的行为,也无法全面掌握企业市场运作的所有有价值信息,为此,论文探讨了政府与代储企业的委托代理关系,研究了不对称信息条件下政府与代储企业之间的利益博弈,提出了针对委托代储企业的激励机制,建立了相应的激励契约模型,通过设置激励系数有效控制应急物资生产能力储备水平,同时设计了收益奖惩系数,根据实际效果对委托代储企业实施奖罚。通过双重激励措施,鼓励企业改善信息共享程度,激励企业增加努力水平。最后,运用MATLAB试验平台对模型求解并结合算例进行了数值计算和分析。结果表明,激励契约模型存在最优激励系数和最优奖惩系数,通过协调可以达到双方联合最优收益值,从而实现最大化社会效益。
The agent emergency supplies productivity capacities reservation system can decrease occupied funds reserve and reduce resource waste caused by material deterioration,which can enhance the supply of materials in the condition of emergency.Improving the effort of an enterprise is an important factor to make the agent reserve system become fully effective.However,on the one hand,in the process of agent emergency supplies productivity capacities reservation,the government and the enterprise pursue different objectives.There exist benefit gambling relations.On the other hand,because of the asymmetric information,the government cannot completely observe the company’s behavior,and cannot get a full grasp of market information.The enterprise may suffer from the highest emotional burnout,or may be tempted to dismiss destructive speculation in order to maximize revenues in the process of agent reservation.Either reason can lead to the decrease of the effort level,which will bring hidden troubles for emergency supplies in the condition of emergency.Hence,how to constraint the enterprise’s behavior and increase its effort effectively is critical to making the agent reserve system function adequately,while designing adequate incentive contract is a viable way for solving this problem.According to the above analysis,this article is organized as follows.Section one mainly discusses the principal-agent relationship between the government and the enterprise,and studies the interests gambling between the two sides under asymmetric information.Section two proposes the incentive mechanism aiming at the enterprise and establishes the incentive contract model based on three hypotheses.By setting incentive coefficient to control capacity reservation level of emergency supplies effectively,the paper also sets rewards and punishment coefficients,implements rewards and punishment to encourage the enterprise to improve information sharing degree,and increases efforts through double incentives.Then we use Lagrange method to solve and a
作者
高晓宁
田军
冯耕中
GAO Xiao-ning;TIAN Jun;FENG Geng-zhong(School of management,Xi’an Jiao tong University,Xi’an 710049,China)
出处
《管理工程学报》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2019年第1期182-188,共7页
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71171157)
国家自然科学基金资助重大项目(71390331)
关键词
应急物资
生产能力储备
委托代储系统
激励契约模型
Emergency supplies
Capacity reservation
Agent reserve system
Incentive contract model
