摘要
本文从外包激励的一般模型入手,结合信息不对称理论,构建了基于市场基准和监控机制相结合的业务外包激励模型,并分析了这两个机制的引入对最优外包契约的影响。市场基准和监控机制的引入可以有效缓解外包过程中信息不对称引起的道德风险,降低外包企业的代理成本和外包总成本。
On the basis of information dissymmetry theory,this paper designs an incentive model of outsourcing in which market benchmark and monitoring mechanism are involved.We analyze the effects of these mechanisms and find that,market benchmark and monitoring mechanism can mitigate information dissymmetry and moral risk within outsourcing implementation.These mechanisms can also reduce the agent cost and total cost of outsourcing.
出处
《管理评论》
2007年第2期52-56,共5页
Management Review
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70372047)
