摘要
我国上市公司之间存在着广泛的董事联盟关系,其对公司治理产生的重要影响会反映在上市公司股价中。伴随着金融市场的复杂性、参与人群的差异性,股价崩盘风险在近几年始终困扰着我国经济发展。鉴于此,文章以2008年至2014年沪、深两市A股上市公司为研究对象,实证检验了董事联盟对股价崩盘风险的影响。结果显示：存在董事联盟的上市公司股价崩盘风险较大;同时,董事网络中心企业的股票收益向好发展,但股价的稳定性要弱于网络边缘的企业。因此,为维稳我国股市的繁荣发展,上市公司在建立董事联盟关系要秉持适度联结的原则,防范过度联盟造成股价波动。
It is an obvious phenomenon that there are extensive connections between the listed com- panies by directors in China, which will affect corporate governance behavior and eventually reflect in the company＇s stock price. In fact, stock crash risk is the current hot issue under the background of financial market turbulence. Thus, based on the China＇s A-share listed companies from 2008 to 2014 in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange as the samples, this paper studied on the impact of director associations and the centrality on the stock price crash risk. The results show that, director associations can significantly exacerbate negative stock return and the volatility of stock price, especially in the listed companies with large amount of associations; meanwhile, the high centrality of the listed companies has significant decreased negative stock return, but its stock price volatility is acuter than that the low cen- trality. Consequently, in order to maintain the stable development of capital market, and the instability of the stock price, it is necessary to establish the associate in moderate principle.
作者
杨松令
王淼
刘亭立
YANG Song-ling;WANG Miao;LIU Ting-li(School of Economics and Management,Beijing University of Technology,Beijing 100124,China)
出处
《数理统计与管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2018年第6期1114-1124,共11页
Journal of Applied Statistics and Management
基金
国家社科基金项目资助项目(13AGL003)
关键词
董事联盟
信息不对称
股价崩盘风险
公司治理
director associations
asymmetric information
stock price crash risk
corporate governance
