摘要
股价崩盘风险会导致股东财富的巨大损失,甚至损害资本市场的效率。已有文献发现,公司高管掩盖坏消息的机会主义行为是导致股价崩盘风险的重要因素,随之,本文关心高管是否会因股价崩盘风险上升而受到惩罚。研究发现,股价崩盘风险与高管薪酬显著负相关,在进行了内生性检验和一系列稳健性测试后,该结论依然存在。这表明,中国上市公司高管的确因为股价崩盘风险而受到了惩罚。在按照所有制、股权结构、机构投资者持股比重和市场化分组的样本中,股价崩盘风险惩罚效应都存在,不过,股价崩盘风险的惩罚效应随着管理者权力的上升而削弱。
Stock price crash leads to big loss of shareholder and even damages the efficiency of capital market. Therefore, stock price crash risk has been a hot topic in the field of finance. Especially after recent financial crisis starting from 2007, the public is interested in the determinants of crash risk. So many paper begins to study the determinants of crash risk. And researches find that the opportunism by executives is main cause of crash. Executives have the incentive to hide bad news. Subsequent research began to investigate the influence of va- rious factors of company executives hiding bad news motivation and ability. But few literatures pay attention to the e- conomic consequences of stock price crash risk. If we are not aware of the negative or positive consequences of the stock price crash, the value of the policy will be greatly reduced. As the actual controller of the company and the shareholder＇s agent, the management should be blame. The most effective mechanism to incentive and constraint management is compensation contract. Then we are concerned about whether the executives are punished for stock crash. If the board of directors works, the executive compensation contract should naturally contain information about stock price crash, which should be accompanied by a reduction in executive pay when a stock price crash oc- curs. But if the board is inefficient, the manager compensation will not be decreased. So it is an empirical question. Based on this, this paper selects China A-share listed companies from 2000 to 2014 as a sample, and systemati- cally studies the impact of stock price crash risk on executive compensation. We find that the executive compensa- tion is negatively associated with stock price crash risk. And the results exist in（ 1 ） SOEs and non-SOEs; （2） firms with different levels of ownership concentration ; （3） firms with different levels of institutional ownership ; and （4） firms located in different regions. Further analysis indicates that the effect is attenuated
出处
《经济管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2017年第12期136-156,共21页
Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )
基金
国家自然科学基金项目"制度环境
公司治理与高管治理机制有效性"(71372119)
国家自然科学基金项目"会计信息质量对股价崩盘风险的影响机理及经济后果研究"(71472002)
教育部人文社会科学基金项目"股权激励在企业资本配置中的作用机理与效果研究"(14YJA630082)
关键词
股价崩盘风险
高管薪酬
公司治理
stock price crash risk
executive compensation
corporate governance
