摘要
基于演化博弈理论,构建了地方政府和发电企业之间的博弈模型,分析了两者之间的复制动态和演化稳定趋势.研究表明,当企业超额排放预期增加收益发生变化时,此博弈系统的演化会出现多种不同的均衡.为此,地方政府需要采取加大对积极遵守碳约束减排企业的激励、适当提高碳市场碳交易价格、降低地方政府监管严格与宽松时的成本差、加强民众对政府的监督等措施,来督促引导发电企业自觉减排,从而实现社会碳排放总量的控制目标.
Based on evolutionary game theory,agame model between local governments and power generation enterprises was constructed,and then the dynamic stability and evolution trend were analyzed.The analysis result suggests that there exist some different equilibria in the evolution of the game system when the expected profits of enterprises are changing.Accordingly,local governments need to take some measures,for example,strengthening incentives to enterprises who actively abide by emission reduction polices,increasing carbon trading prices appropriately,reducing the variance of cost when local governments choose strict regulation or loose regulation,and strengthening public supervision of the governments,so as to urge the power generation enterprises to consciously reduce carbon emissions,thus achieving control over the overall carbon emissions.
基金
国家自然科学基金(71571171)资助
关键词
节能减排
碳交易机制
演化博弈
发电企业
地方政府
energy saving and emission reduction
carbon trading mechanism
evolutionary game
powergeneration enterprises
local governments
