摘要
中国电力市场的建设还处于初级阶段,市场参与者的交易行为尚不规范,存在许多违规行为,为维护电力市场的平稳高效运行,迫切需要制定科学有效的监管和激励机制。从监管实际需求出发,建立了监管机构、发电企业和电力用户的三方博弈模型,分别分析静态奖惩和动态奖惩机制下系统的演化稳定策略。仿真分析结果表明:静态奖惩机制下三方无法达到演化稳定;动态奖惩机制下三方策略可以达到稳定平衡,通过调整相关参数可以达到理想的稳定状态,实现了有效监管。最后根据三方演化结果和仿真分析结果给出相关政策建议。
The construction of China's electricity market is still in the primary stage,the trading behavior of market participants is not standardized,and there are many violations.In order to maintain the stable and efficient operation of the electricity market,scientific and effective supervision and incentive mechanisms are urgently needed.Starting from the actual needs of supervision,a three-party game model of regulatory agencies,power generation companies and power users were established.The evolutionary and stable strategies of this system was analyzed under the static and dynamic premium and penalty mechanisms respectively.The simulation results show that the evolution and stability of the system could not be achieved under the static premium and penalty mechanism.In contrast,the stable balance of the system can be achieved under the dynamic mechanism.By adjusting the relevant parameters,an ideal stable state can be achieved,and effective supervision can be realized.Finally,relevant policy recommendations are given based on the results of the evolutionary game and simulation analysis.
作者
谢敬东
王诗瑶
周雪梅
孙波
孙欣
XIE Jing-dong;WANG Shi-yao;ZHOU Xue-mei;SUN Bo;SUN Xin(Energy and Power Science and Technology Center,Shanghai University of Electric Power,Shanghai 200082,China;College of Economics and Management,Shanghai University of Electric Power,Shanghai 200082,China;College of Electric Power Engineering,Shanghai University of Electric Power,Shanghai 200082,China)
出处
《科学技术与工程》
北大核心
2021年第35期15072-15083,共12页
Science Technology and Engineering
基金
国家自然科学基金(51507099)
教育部人文社会科学研究基金(15YJCZH147)
上海市经济和信息化委员会科研项目(20200606)。
关键词
电力市场
监管机制
三方演化博弈
奖惩机制
信用管理
electricity market
regulatory mechanism
tripartite evolutionary game
premium and penalty mechanism
credit managemen
