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规制强度、腐败与创新抑制——基于贝叶斯博弈均衡的分析 被引量:6

Regulation Intensity,Corruption and Innovation Suppression——Based on Bayesian Game Equilibrium Analysis
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摘要 反腐败促进还是抑制了企业创新是学术圈讨论的热点问题。本文将政府规制强度引入该问题的研究,从政府、官员、企业博弈的角度来揭示规制强度、腐败、创新之间的内在机理。通过构建政府、官员、企业的不完全信息博弈模型得到贝叶斯纳什均衡发现:过度的政府规制导致了权利寻租抑制企业创新,放松规制压缩了权利寻租的空间促进企业创新。并运用中国2000—2014年间的省级面板数据,采用三阶段最小二乘法对行政垄断、腐败、创新之间的关系进行实证检验。研究表明,腐败对创新的影响显著为负,行政性收费对腐败的影响显著为正。本文得出的启示是:企业偏好于通过行贿来获取政治关系抑制了企业创新,反腐切断政治关联促进企业创新。过度的政府规制导致的权利寻租是腐败的源头,简政放权压缩寻租空间抑制腐败发生。 Whether anti-corruption promotes or restrains enterprise innovation is a hot topic in academic circles.This paper introduces the intensity of government regulation into the research of this issue,and reveals the internal mechanism between regulation intensity,corruption and innovation from the perspective of government,official and enterprise game.By building the incomplete information game model of government,officials and enterprise,this paper gets the Bayesian Nash equilibrium and finds,excessive government regulation leads to the rent-seeking and restrain enterprise innovation,while relaxed government regulation compresses the space of rent-seeking and promotes enterprise innovation.In addition,this paper uses the provincial panel data during the period 2000-2014in China to carry out an empirical test,the relationship between administrative monopoly,corruption and innovation is tested by three-stage least squares method.The results show that corruption has a significant negative impact on innovation,and administrative charges have a significant positive impact on corruption.The implication of this paper is that enterprises prefer to obtain political relations through bribery,which restrains enterprise innovation,and anti-corruption cuts off political relations and thus promotes business innovation.Excessive government regulation leads to the rent-seeking,which is the source of corruption,while through streamline administration and institute decentralization,government can compresse the space of rent-seeking and restrain corruption.
出处 《当代经济科学》 CSSCI 北大核心 2018年第1期26-34,共9页 Modern Economic Science
基金 国家自然科学基金青年科学基金项目"开放创新环境下战略导向与组织柔性对双元创新的研究"(71402139) 中国博士后基金特别资助项目"中国人力资本错配影响企业自主创新的内生机理研究"(2016T90939)
关键词 腐败 规制强度 创新 贝叶斯博弈 Corruption Regulation intensity Innovation Bayesian game
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