摘要
跨界水污染问题一般涉及多个行政主体利益，在缺乏成熟制度设计的现状下通常难以顺利解决。博弈模型在精确刻画行政主体策略和研判决策收益方面具有显著优势，可以为跨界水污染问题提供理论上的解决思路和方案。文章首先讨论了跨界水污染博弈模型的一般形态；然后简要回顾了跨界水污染博弈文献在转移支付制度、约束机制和环境政策三方面的研究文献；最后针对现实中跨行政区划的流域水污染问题，提出跨界水污染博弈在设计水质、水量双重环境政策和评估不同补偿原则效果两方面的研究方向及相关政策含义。
Transboundary water pollution is usually difficult to deal with in the absence of mature mechanisms as it is related to the interests of multiple administrative subjects. The game models have a significant advantage in accurately characterizing the administrative subjects＇ strategies and judging the benefits of decisions so that they can provide a theoretical solution for the transboundary water pollution problem. On the basis of introducing the general form of the game models taking transboundary water pollution into consideration, this paper briefly discusses the literature on transboundary water pollution game in the aspects of transfer payment system, restraint mechanism and environmental policy. In view of the research status, this paper suggests that the research on transboundary water pollution game needs to be extended in the design of dual environmental policy of water quality and quantity and in the evaluation of different compensation principles.
出处
《生态经济》
北大核心
2018年第2期175-178,200,共5页
Ecological Economy
关键词
跨界水污染
博弈模型
转移支付
约束机制
环境政策
transboundary water pollution
game model
transfer payment
restraint mechanism
environmental policy
