摘要
上海合作组织框架内,各成员国既拥有共同的环境利益,同时又存在环境利益的失衡。基于博弈分析得出,成员国各方的环保合作可以较低的成本实现组织环境利益的增进;而在组织内部的环保合作进程尚且无法全面推进时,由合作意愿更强的一方负责环保可以更高的效率获得环境利益的增进。为实现上海合作组织成员国间环境利益的协调,应按照双边、多边、国际公约的顺序分阶段地建立起成员国间的环保合作机制;同时加强组织环境立法,矫正成员国间环境利益的失衡并协调各方环境行为;依照该组织现有法律体系,分层次地构建起环境法律体系。
There exist common as well as imbalanced environmental interests among the member states of SCO （Shanghai Cooperation Organization）. A game theory analysis shows that on the one hand, the enhancement of environmental interests re- garding the whole organization could be achieved through a strengthened cooperation on environmental protection among the member states of SCO at comparatively low costs; on the other hand, provided those states are not in a position to promote this cooperation comprehensively, the party more likely to cooperate with should shoulder the task of protecting environment, with the environmental interests enhanced more efficiently. To coordinate the environmental interests among member states of SCO, it is proposed that the environment-protecting cooperating mechanism should be established gradually in the order of bilateral, muhi- lateral and international convention, that the environmental legislation should be strengthened to rebalance the environmental in- terests and coordinate the environmental performance among member states, and that the environmental law system should be con- structed in line with the existing law system of the SCO.
出处
《辽宁大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》
CSSCI
2017年第2期101-112,共12页
Journal of Liaoning University(Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition)
基金
上海市哲学社会科学规划一般课题"当代中国多元利益矛盾的法经济学分析-以环境利益为典型"(2013BJL003)的阶段性研究成果
关键词
上海合作组织
环境利益
博弈分析
环保合作机制
环境法律体系
Shanghai Cooperation Organization （SCO）
environmental interests
game analysis
cooperation mechanism ofenvironment protection
environmental law system
