摘要
在PPP项目中,当运营商通过投资项目兼任投资者的角色时,会形成双角色主体的情形。然而,双角色主体存在投机行为的风险。因此,为了探讨PPP项目中运营商形成的双角色主体的最优投资决策和收益,降低双角色主体的投机风险,研究基于博弈理论,对PPP项目中运营商的投资收益结构和投机行为进行了分析。同时建立了运营商在4种决策组合下的投资收益模型,并对比分析了其在不同决策情景下的最大投资收益。然后结合数值分析,得出运营商入股成为双角色主体,并付出努力水平和避免投机行为可以实现自有资产的投资收益最大化。同时,结论显示项目公司应制定动态的合同价以降低运营商投机行为的风险。
In Public-private partnerships (PPP) project, when operators act an investor by investing in the project, thescenarios of dual-role subject will be formed. However, there exists risk of speculation of the dual-role subject, which canresult in serious conflicts of interest between pure-investors and the dual-role subject. Therefore, in order to discuss the dual-role subjects’ optimal investment decision and profit under the scenario that operator becomes an investor, and reduce therisk of dual-role subjects’ speculation in PPP project, the structure of investment profits and speculation behavior of theoperators in the PPP project are analyzed based on the game theory. Meanwhile, the investment income models of operatorsare constructed under the four decision combinations. Then, the maximum benefit is analyzed based on different decisionsituations. Combining with a numerical analysis, it is concluded that the operator becoming an investor and exerting effortsand avoiding speculation can maximize the return on investment of private assets. Meanwhile, the results show that projectcompany should establish dynamic contract price to reduce the risk of operators' opportunistic behavior.
出处
《工业工程》
2017年第6期1-8,共8页
Industrial Engineering Journal
基金
国家自然科学基金面上资助项目(71571149)