期刊文献+

PPP背景下控制权配置及其对合作效率影响的模型研究 被引量:63

Theoretical Study on the Efficient Allocation of Control Rights in the Public-Private Partnership(PPP)
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摘要 PPP是公共部门与私人部门合作提供公共品和公共服务的重要模式。本文强调PPP的契约本质,指出合作方特征、产品的公共化程度是PPP合作模式区别于传统的企业与企业合作模式的两大特点,从不完全契约视角出发本研究认为影响PPP合作模式效率的关键是控制权配置。基于这一观点本研究首次通过构建数学模型分析中国背景下PPP合作中的控制权配置与合作效率之间的关系,并指出当存在企业自利性投入的情况下,在不同的参数条件下对公共部门或私人部门赋予不同程度的控制权份额是提高PPP合作效率的关键,同时适当的政府引导能够进一步地提高合作效率。随后的数据模拟也验证了以上结论。 PPP is an important model that the public sectors and private ones collaborate to supply the public goods and public service. This article stresses that the genuine nature of PPP is the contract, and points out that the characteristics of the partners, the public degree of the products are the two main features that PPP is different from the traditional cooperation model among the firms. From the perspective of the incomplete contract this research points out that the key factor of the PPP cooperation efficiency is the allocation of the control fights. Based on this insight, this article at the first time through establishing math model to analyze the relationship between the allocation of control rights and the cooperation efficiency under the background of PPP, and also points out that when there is the enterprise's self-interest investment existed, the key to enhance the PPP efficiency is allocating the different degree of the control rights to the public sector or the private one under the different parameters, meantime the proper governmental guidance can upgrade the collaboration efficiency. The following data simulation improves the conclusions above.
出处 《管理工程学报》 CSSCI 北大核心 2009年第3期23-29,22,共8页 Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management
关键词 PPP 控制权配置 政府主导 合作效率 数据模拟 PPP allocation of control rights governmental guidance cooperation efficiency data simulation
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参考文献17

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引证文献63

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