摘要
公私合作模式(public-private partnership,PPP)是公共部门与私人部门合作提供公共产品(或服务)的重要模式.强调PPP的契约本质,从不完全契约视角出发,研究PPP模式下剩余控制权配置对公私双方投入的影响.通过构建数学模型分析PPP背景下剩余控制权配置与合作双方投入激励之间的关系,研究指出在初始契约规定收益分配方案的情况下,最优的剩余控制权配置范围与初始契约中的收益分配比例、合作双方的技术因素以及双方对预期最终收益的乐观程度有关.
PPP（public-private partnership）is an important model that the public sectors and private ones col- laborate to supply the public goods and public services. This paper believes that the genuine nature of PPP is the contract, and researches the affect of the residual control rights allocation on the parties＇ investment level from the perspective of the incomplete contracts. A mathematical model is used to analyze the relationship be- tween residual control rights allocation and the motivation of both parties＇ investments under the background of PPEThe paper finds that the optimal allocation of residual control rights depends on the parties＇ respective degrees of optimism of the expectation on the final return, both parties＇ technological factors, and the allocation of income provided by the initial contract when there is a proposal of income allocation in the initial contract.
出处
《系统工程学报》
CSCD
北大核心
2013年第2期227-233,共7页
Journal of Systems Engineering
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71271143
71231006)
教育部人文社会科学研究资助项目(11YJA630107)
关键词
公私合作模式
不完全契约
剩余控制权配置
收益分配
投入激励
public-private partnership
contractual incompleteness
allocation of residual control rights
allocation of income
investment incentives
