期刊文献+

PPP项目剩余控制权配置的影响因素研究 被引量:8

Influential Factors of PPP Residual Control Rights Allocation
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摘要 以不完全契约理论为基础,通过建立数学博弈模型,讨论了影响剩余控制权分配的因素,指出合作双方对项目的评价高低程度、投资中各方的不可替代程度以及双方对项目预期合作收益的满意程度是影响剩余控制权配置的重要因素。 The residual control fights allocation is an important issue to PPP project and its cooperation efficiency. Based on incomplete contract theory, a mathematical model was established to study the factors that influence the allocations of residual control fights of PPP projects. It was concluded that the evaluations of projects, the extent of investment irreplaceable of each par- ty and the extent of satisfaction of each party are the main influential factors of PPP residual control fights allocation.
作者 孙慧 卢言红
出处 《武汉理工大学学报(信息与管理工程版)》 CAS 2014年第1期91-94,共4页 Journal of Wuhan University of Technology:Information & Management Engineering
基金 国家自然科学基金资助项目(71271143)
关键词 PPP 不完全契约 剩余控制权分配 public -private- partnerships incomplete contract theory residual control rights allocation
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参考文献19

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