摘要
随着我国反腐力度不断增强,基层集体贪腐案件越来越多地暴露在公众视野之中,为探究潜在贪腐个体转变为实际贪腐群体的内在逻辑,本文采用个案研究法,以海南省C县的骗取征地补偿款案为例,引入收益成本分析视角,从贪腐动机、制度约束、权力合谋、被查处风险这四个维度将集体贪腐分为贪腐动机萌发期、潜在贪腐群体合谋期和贪腐风险收益对比期三个阶段。研究表明:合谋能促进权力联合、增强信息不对称、分摊腐败风险、实现利益分配,从而具有消解被揭发风险、隐蔽腐败谋划的优势。产生贪腐动机后的潜在贪腐群体针对权力制衡的制度设计选择合谋,使其在收益成本分析的主观判断过程中易提高贪腐的可行性,结合客观惩处情况,潜在群体将进一步判断是否加入贪腐群体。本文在基层集体贪腐的形成机理及个案深入研究方面作出了创新性探索。
The objective of this paper is to illustrate the logic and the key precipitating factors of participating junior collective corruption.An exploratory case study involves six junior officers defrauded lose-land compensation in Hainan Province is uesd in this paper.The analysis,based on the literatures and the case,reveals that collusion can promote power coalition as well as asymmetric information,apportion corruption risks,and then realize benefit distribution,it has the strengths to reduce investigation risks and conceal corruption plan.After producing corruption motivation,village officials usually choose collusion to against the check-and-balance system,and it would improve corruption feasibility during the cost-benefit analysis process of potential corruption group's subjective judgement.By combining the objective punishment situation,officials will make a decision about whether join the corruption group or not.We find that motivation,institutional restriction,and power collusion as well as investigation risks could divide collective corruption into three periods:The germination of corruption motivation,the collusion of potential corruption group and the comparison of corruption's risks and benefits.And this study draws on the case to explore the logic of junior collective corruption,which can be improved in research about other kinds of corruption.
出处
《公共管理学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2017年第4期54-63,共10页
Journal of Public Management
基金
教育部重大课题攻关项目(16JZD026)
广东省普通高校特色创新类项目(2015WTSCX001)
关键词
集体贪腐
收益成本分析
土地流转
Collective Corruption
Cost-benefit Analysis
Land Conversion
