摘要
研究目的:分析不同治理政策对地方政府土地违法面积变化的影响,为治理政策制定提供依据。研究方法:构建地方政府土地违法的系统动力学模型,对不同治理方案下2010—2020年地方政府土地违法面积的变化情况进行仿真模拟。研究结果:(1)在2009年的治理水平下,2010—2020年地方政府土地违法面积将不断增加,腐败压力指数、耕地压力和违法治理压力均持续加大,治理力度亟待加大;(2)事后惩罚型政策具有延迟性,地方政府土地违法面积将呈现先增后减的趋势;事中监督型政策对地方政府土地违法的抑制效果较为明显,但对地方政府的土地腐败不起作用;事前预防型政策对抑制地方政府土地违法更有效,但政策实施存在一定的难度。研究结论:单一的治理政策具有一定的局限性,结合事前预防、事中监督和事后惩处进行综合治理能够有效遏制地方政府土地违法。
The purpose of this paper is to study that how different control policies impact the illegal land use of local government, and try to provide theoretical reference for designing the control policies. Method employed is System Dynamic （SD） model. The SD model for simulating the illegal land use of local governments was developed given the control schemes for illegal land use classified into 3 types after repeated integrated test. Simulations have been done to simulate how the illegal land use area changes under different types of control schemes over the period 2010 to 2020. The results show that： 1） given the control level in 2009, the cultivated land area would continue to decrease, meanwhile pressure indexes for corruption, cultivated land and illegal control would continue to grow higher, and the illegal land use area would continue to increase in the future. 2） As ex-post punishment policies have the delayed effect, under this kind of control policies, illegal land use area would trend to increase firstly and then decrease later.Simultaneous supervision policies have much more obvious control effect on illegal land use, but they do not affect land corruption. Prior preventive policies can control the illegal land use from the beginning, so illegal land use area would trend to decrease under this kind of control policies. But there are some difficulties in implementing this kind of policies. It is concluded that each single kind of control policy has its limitations. Integrated control policies which combine with ex-ante prevention, simultaneous supervision and ex-post punishment can have the best control affect on the illegal land use of local government~,
出处
《中国土地科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2013年第4期53-59,共7页
China Land Science
基金
华中科技大学自主创新研究基金文科前沿探索项目"国土资源系统廉政风险管理研究"
关键词
土地管理
土地违法
地方政府
治理政策
系统动力学
land administration
illegal land use
local government
control policy
system dynamics
