摘要
本文针对拥有网络直销渠道的制造商,考虑零售商实体渠道促销努力水平及消费者的搭便车行为,在Nash博弈和零售商主导的Stackelberg博弈下,就零售商开通网络渠道的问题进行研究。通过理论和数值分析,得到以下结论:零售商渠道地位对其开通网络渠道影响不大;开通后,制造商利润减小,当实体渠道基本市场份额较小时,零售商利润增大;零售商应根据实体渠道基本市场份额大小来决定是否开通网络渠道。
For a manufacturer with online direct sales channels,considering the entity channel sales promotion effort level and free-riding behavior of consumers,this paper studies the question of the retailers opening the online sales channel in the Nash decision-making and the retailer lead Stackelberg decentralized decision-making. Through the theoretical and numerical analysis,following conclusions are obtained. The retailer channel status has little effect on its opening network channel;after the opening,the profits of the manufacturer are reduced,and the retailers＇,profits increase when the basic entity channel market share is relatively small. According to above,retailers should better make the decision of opening the online sales channel or not according to the basic market share of the entity channel.
出处
《工业技术经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2017年第11期44-54,共11页
Journal of Industrial Technological Economics
基金
国家社科基金项目"大数据背景下网购消费者行为模式与网购评语引导机理研究"(项目编号:15CGL031)
大连市科技计划项目"基于超电子的城市交通出行行为动态模型与算法研究"(项目编号:2015A11GX016)
大连市高层次人才创新支持计划项目"交通运输大数据的知识挖掘与规则提取"(项目编号:2015R063)
中央高校基本科研业务费(项目编号:3132016306
3132017085)
关键词
多渠道
渠道选择
定价
搭便车
促销努力
网络渠道
multi-channel
channel selection
pricing
free-riding
sales promotion effort
internet channel
