摘要
美国主导创设了WTO争端解决机制。通过这一机制,美国提起WTO申诉的频率以及申诉的胜诉率都极高,其自助执行能力在世界范围内也最强,但是近年来美国却频频与各国进行谈判并试图通过签订大区域贸易协定来架空WTO争端解决机制,甚至直接退出这个机制。从WTO裁决的角度来看,这似乎意味着WTO原告胜诉裁决的执行效果和国家利益的完全实现之间并不完全重合。一方面,部分原告胜诉裁决执行不完全仍然可以间接的实现国家利益;另一方面,部分原告胜诉裁决完全执行却不能完全的实现国家利益。这种背离现象虽然客观上起到了调节WTO申诉率的作用,然而伴随着社会经济和政治大环境的演变,这一现象却成为如美国这样具有强大自助执行能力的大国意欲改造甚至抛弃WTO体系的重要原因。鉴于此,中国需要在进一步提高WTO申诉率的基础上,分类评估胜诉裁决执行的效果,同时在厘清美国政治结构失衡对执行难度的影响后,跟进甚至超越美国对国际经贸纠纷解决程序的设计与引导。
The WTO dispute settlement mechanism created by the United States is the centerpiece of the multilateral trading system. Both the appeal rate and the plaintiff＇ s wining rate are very high for the United States. Also the self-help ability of the United States to execute the rulings is the strongest in the world. However, in recent years the United States has negotia- ted a large regional trade agreement to replace the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, and is even considering withdrawing from the mechanism directly. From perspective of WTO rulings, it seems that there is no overlap between the enforcement of the WTO plaintiffs＇ ruling and the full realization of national interests. Further observations show that a big gap exists between the enforcement of the WTO plaintiffs＇ victory ruling and the implementation of the WTO treaty ne- gotiation interests. On the one hand, a ruling that cannot be fully implemented can still indi- rectly realize some of the treaty interests. On the other hand, a ruling that can be fully imple- mented may be unable to fully realize the treaty interests. This fragmentation can have the effect of regulating the WTO appeal rate. However, along with the change of social, economic and po- litical environment, the deviation has become an important reason for countries with strong abili- ty of self-help execution to abandon the WTO system. In view of this situation, China needs to increase the complaint rate, conduct classified evaluation of the effects of WTO rulings, pay at- tention to the influence of the imbalance in the structure of domestic policy on the implementa- tion of WTO rulings, and follow up and overtake the design and guidance of the dispute settle- ment procedure imposed by the US.
出处
《环球法律评论》
CSSCI
北大核心
2017年第5期177-192,共16页
Global Law Review
基金
2012年度国家社会科学基金青年项目"WTO争端解决机制的原告利益取向与对策研究"(12CFX110)
教育部2014年度高等学校全国优秀博士学位论文作者专项资金资助项目"国际经贸法律规则博弈与中国角色研究"(201407)的研究成果
