摘要
目前国内法理学界对于法律规范的研究要远远超过法律概念,一个重要原因或许在于受到"法理论上的规范主义"的影响。其中强规范主义立场认为,法律概念没有自身意义和语义所指,完全由包含它们的法律规范来决定甚至穷尽。对此可从性质论与功能论两方面进行反驳。在一般意义上,概念是对象的属性在观念中的呈现,是思维的工具,无法被还原为语词,也不由语言层面的规范来决定和穷尽。在法律语境中,法律概念的语义所指是作为制度性事实的法律事实,纯粹规范上的推论分析无法赋予其意义。法律概念在法律推理中发挥着首要功能,很多时候需要由解释者对法律概念的语义进行确证或具体化。特定法律概念是引发特定法律后果的前提,法律概念的语义构成目的论证的界限,有时也会对后者施加论证负担。因此,法律概念是法律规范的基础,也是进行法律思维和推理的根本环节。法理学界需要加强对于以法律概念为中心的一般法学说的研究。
Currently the Chinese jurisprudence circle carries out far more studies on legal norms than on legal concepts. An important reason for this phenomenon perhaps is the influence of ＂normativism in legal theory＂. A strong version of this theory holds that, legal concepts have no meaning in them- selves and thus no semantic references on their own, but are determined or even exhausted by the le- gal norms in which they are contained. We can use nature theory and function theory about legal Con- cepts to refute this standpoint. In general sense, concepts are mental presentations of properties of things in human conception. As a tool of thinking, they could neither be reduced to words, nor be de- termined and exhausted by norms at the linguistic level. In the legal context, the semantic reference of a legal concept is a legal fact in the sense of institutional fact, and cannot be given any meaning by the pure inferential analysis of norms. Legal concepts play a primary role in legal reasoning： it is of- ten the interpreters themselves who have to substantiate or concretize the semantics of a legal concept; specific legal concepts are the premise of special legal consequences; the semantics of legal concepts also delimits teleological arguments or imposes burden of argumentation on the latter, thereby consti- tuting the basis of legal norms and the key links in both legal thoughts and reasoning. Now it is time for scholars in jurisprudence to enhance the studies on general juristic theory by focusing on legal con- cepts again.
出处
《法学研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2017年第4期74-96,共23页
Chinese Journal of Law
基金
“中国政法大学优秀中青年教师培养支持资助项目”的阶段性成果
