摘要
本文研究了发生控制权转移的无偿划转对国有企业获取政府补贴的影响,研究发现,发生控制权转移的无偿划转,在其后的两年之内,显著获得了更多的政府补贴;进一步研究发现,对于公司治理较好的国有企业而言,发生了无偿划转并且控制权也转移的企业获得更多的政府补贴;此外,获得更多政府补贴的国有企业也为政府解决了更多的就业问题。本文的研究表明,低交易成本的无偿划转能为政府解决就业问题,这在一定程度上补充并完善了以政府为主导的控制权转移理论的效率问题。
The gratuitous transfer of the enterprises＇ state-owned property rights with control rights may be detrimental to firms＇ future operation and value. Based on this natural experiment, this paper inves- tigates how the gratuitous transfer of the enterprises＇ state-owned property rights with control rights impacts subsidies from government and social welfare. We find that these subsidies significantly increase after the gratuitous transfer. A further study shows that this phenomenon is more significant in firms with better corpo- ration governance. This paper provides evidence on applicability of the theory of control rights transfer be- tween government and managers on emerging markets.
作者
曾建光
步丹璐
饶品贵
Zeng Jianguang Bu Danlu Rao Pingui
出处
《世界经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2017年第7期147-168,共22页
The Journal of World Economy
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71572152
71472073)
四川省社科规划项目(SC15B087)
西南财经大学重大基础理论研究项目(JBK161105)
中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金项目(16CX150206)的资助
关键词
国有企业
无偿划转
控制权转移
政府补贴
就业
state-owned enterprise, the gratuitous transfer of the enterprises＇ state-owned propertyrights, control rights transfer, government subsidies, employment
