摘要
"应得"这个词有两种基本功能,在道德哲学中被用作道德评价,在政治哲学中被用作分配原则。当应得被用作分配原则的时候,它被看做是一种对立于其他原则的正义原则,如平等和资格。从应得理论家的观点看,应得既能用作道德评价,也能用作分配原则。但是,从反应得理论家的观点看,应得不能用于分配正义,尽管他们没有为其主张提供一种合理的论证。针对上述两种观点,本文提出这样一种论证:一方面,应得理论家们的观点是不正确的,因为应得不能成为分配的原则;另一方面,罗尔斯和其他反应得理论家也是不正确的,因为他们没有对应得理论给予决定性的反驳。
The term ＂deserve＂ has two basic functions, which is used as a moral value in moral philoso- phy and as a distributive principle in political philosophy. When used as a distributive principle, it is seen as a principle of justice as opposed to other principles, such as equality and entitlement. Viewed from the perspective of theorists in favor of deserve, the term can be used both as a moral value and a distributive principle. But from the point of view of theorists disapproving deserve, the term can＇t be used in distributive justice, even though they don＇t give a reasonable justification for their claim. The paper is to put forward a justification against both the conceptions of deserve： First, the conception of the theorists for deserve is incorrect, because ＂deserve＂ can＇t be a principle of distribution; second, John Rawls and other theorists against deserve is not right either, because they failed to give an overwhelming refutation to the conception of deserve.
作者
姚大志
YAO Da-zhi(School of Philosophy and Sociology, Jilin University, Changchun, Jilin 130012)
出处
《中国人民大学学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2017年第2期46-54,共9页
Journal of Renmin University of China
基金
国家社会科学基金项目"制度正义的理念研究"(15BZX022)
国家2011计划司法文明协同创新中心研究成果
