摘要
地方官员在一些惠农政策执行中往往热衷于投入重金打造亮点工程。X区的新农村建设经历了从面上推进到亮点工程的转变过程,为我们观察亮点工程的生成逻辑提供了一幅丰富的经验画面。X区的新农村建设经验表明,地方官员之所以倒向打造亮点工程在表象上体现为官员的政绩驱动,但深层次的原因则是体制性的。在政策执行的体制环境变得愈加集权,地方官员面临的横向竞争加剧,向上释放政绩信号的压力促使地方官员放弃原来资源分配较为均衡的面上推进战略,转而采用资源高度集中投入但能够向上发出更加明亮政绩信号的亮点工程打造战略。X区的经验表明,打造亮点工程可以作为一种社会动员技术而存在,但是由于集权型竞争体制的存在,又很容易导向政绩工程的泥潭。
The local officials usually tend to build Point Project with heavily cost in the process of rural preferential agricultural policy implementation process. Taking the process of New Countryside Building of X city as example, the model had experienced the change from equitable model to Point Project model through the time from 2006 to 2013. It seems that, the local officials like the Point project model not only because the performance driven, but more fundamentally because the system logic of Chinese bureaucracy. When the policy implementation process became more centralized controlled by higher government, the lower local officials in X City had to confront more fierce competition in the New Countryside Construction Policy Process. The experience proved that the equitable model had little help for the local officials to get good performance, whereas the Point Project model had the magic power for the local officials to do that, because the Point Project model had the advantage to launch signals in the policy process. The policy implementation experience of X city calls us to reflect that, Point Project could to be a kind of social mobilization technology, but because the work of the Chinese centralized and competition system, the Point Project also easy to become Performance Engineering.
出处
《甘肃行政学院学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第6期19-30,共12页
Journal of Gansu Administration Institute
基金
国家社会科学基金重大项目:"构建全民共建共享的社会治理格局研究:聚集人口流入型地区"(15ZDC028)
国家社会科学基金青年项目"大都市城乡结合部非正规经济的管制困境与治理模式创新研究"(15CZZ030)
