摘要
象征性治理是基层政府治理的一种方式或者治理状态,它主要以四种形式存在。在政府治理领域,信号可分为能力信号和忠诚信号两类;按照发出信号成本的高低,象征性治理可分为三个层面。象征性治理发生的内在机理是,官僚体制内作为代理人的官员为其预期效用的最大化而发出关于自身能力或忠诚态度的信号;信号的有效性与发出信号所付出的成本呈正比;但随着官员能力的提高,其能够承担的成本也会上升,因而原有信号的有效性是逐步递减的,由此形成这几种象征性治理行为的依次演变。
Symbolic governance is a kind of governance used for describing governance failure in local government. It exists as four styles and can be divided into capability model and loyalty model, each model has three degrees according to their costs. The mechanism of Symbolic governance is that the signals are sent by the officials for their maximum interests, but the effectiveness of the signals is proportional to its cost. As the rising of the officials＇ ability, the effectiveness of the signals is in decline. This leads to the evolution of the four kinds of symbolic governance in turns.
出处
《武汉大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第5期673-678,共6页
Wuhan University Journal：Philosophy & Social Science
关键词
象征性治理
信号理论
激励机制
政府行为
symbolic governance
signaling theory
incentive system
governmental behavior
