摘要
双层股权制度在现代新兴高科技企业中的使用率持续上升。对这种新兴公司治理机制的研究,以往主要集中在它引发的委托代理问题上,而关于它对创新的影响的研究尚是一个缺口。本文通过引入短期业绩敏感性拓展了Chemmanur-Jiao模型,对此问题做出了理论分析,并以Bv D-Osiris全球上市公司数据库中2004—2013全球互联网上市公司为样本对模型分析的结果进行了实证检验。研究发现,在全球意义上,双股制对企业创新有显著的促进作用,这一作用在使用倾向得分匹配法及Heckman两阶段模型对样本选择问题进行处理后更为显著且影响更大。同时,双股制的创新促进作用还取决于外部投资者的短期业绩敏感性,这在新兴国家与发达国家有显著差异。在外部制衡机制不完善的新兴国家中,采用双股制而且创始人任CEO或董事长反而会减少创新投入。进一步的实验设计的证据表明,中国目前采用双层股权制度的条件还不成熟。
The dual-class structure is a special type of corporate governance mechanism by which voting rights and cash- flow rights are asymmetrically allocated. This structure enables founders to maintain control over firms without increasing their own capital proportionally when financing externally. It has recently become globally popular for high-tech firms to adopt the dual-class structure, and the relevant literature focuses on the related agency issues. This paper, in contrast, explores the impact of this special governance structure on innovation. We analyze global listed internet firms, which are the pace setters of the new economy. Theoretically, we expand the Chemmanur ＆ Jiao （2012） model to incorporate a new component of short-term performance sensitivity to generate our hypotheses. Our model results indicate that the dual-class structure is helpful in promoting innovation in general. Furthermore, our theoretical results suggest that the effects of the dual-class structure on innovation depend on external monitoring. In a developed economy in which external monitoring is effective, outside investors are less sensitive to short-term performance. In such an environment, the dual-class structure with a chairman- CEO founder is helpful in promoting innovation. In contrast, in a developing economy in which external monitoring is ineffective,the dual-class structure with a chairman-CEO founder impedes innovation. In such an economy, the dual-class structure with a hired professional manager benefits innovation. Empirically, we test the hypotheses using a global dataset of listed internet companies collected manually from BvD- Osiris. Our sample period covers 2004 through 2013. Our results present significant evidence that the dual-class structure facilitates high-tech firms＇ innovation in general. The evidence is even more pronounced under the propensity score matching and Heckman selection model specifications, which mitigate selection bias issues. To address the identification issues, we use a triple-diff
出处
《经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2017年第1期149-164,共16页
Economic Research Journal
基金
国家自然科学基金(项目编号:71673281)的资助
关键词
双层股权结构
创新
互联网企业
公司治理
Dual-class Structure
Innovation
Internet Firm
Corporate Governance
