摘要
惩罚性赔偿具有"准刑罚"的特征,背离了损害填补的基本原理;同时,惩罚性赔偿又是现行法中被严重"软化"的制度,无法实现其应有的威慑功能。造成惩罚性赔偿被"软化"的原因在于当前理论必然会导致受害人"不当得利"的结果。故此,应当分两步对惩罚性赔偿进行重构性修复:其一,将惩罚性赔偿的适用范围限定为"执法落差"的情形,并解除其它不合理限制,以恢复其完整的威慑功能;其二,建立惩罚性赔偿金的合理分配机制,以化解受害人的"不当得利"。经重构的惩罚性赔偿实为补偿性赔偿的特殊安排,由此带来的上升行为风险可以通过责任保险进行分散。
Punitive damages have a characteristic of ＂quasi-penalty＂, which deviates from the principle of damage compensation. Meanwhile, it is a seriously softened system in the positive laws, and cannot realize its proper deterrence function. The reason of such system been softened is that the model under current theory inevitably results in unjust enrichment of the plaintiff. Therefore, the system of punitive damages should be re-designed by two steps： First, the scope of application should be limited as the situation of ＂enforcement gag＂, and other limitations should be abolished; second, an equitable distribution mechanism of punitive damages should be designed to remove the unjust enrichment of the plaintiff. The re-designed punitive damages would be a special arrangement of compensatory damages; and the raised risks could be dispersed through liability insurance.
作者
叶延玺
Ye Yanxi(Zhejiang University of Finance ＆ Economics Dongfang College Ningbo China 314408)
出处
《广西政法管理干部学院学报》
2016年第6期49-56,共8页
Journal of Guangxi Administrative Cadre Institute of Politics and Law
基金
杭州市哲学社会科学规划课题:<惩罚性赔偿制度的重构研究--以杭州法院判例的分析为基础>(项目编号:M15JC076)
教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目:<责任保险对侵权法的影响研究>(项目编号:15YJC820070)
关键词
惩罚性赔偿
不当得利
威慑功能
“执法落差”
punitive damages
unjust enrichment
deterrence function
enforcement gap
