摘要
考虑到企业产品差异性、企业的私有化程度、外国资金的渗透等因素,研究了伯川德竞争情形下私有化程度、外资渗透与社会福利之间的关系以及私有化程度、外资渗透对混合双寡头市场的影响。首先建立混合双寡头的伯川德竞争模型,得出伯川德均衡解,然后在社会福利最大化下分产品为替代产品和互补产品两种情形分别得出了最优私有化程度的解,进而分析了外资渗透(或国内控股)对私有化程度与混合双寡头市场的影响。研究表明,生产替代性产品的企业进行价格竞争时,部分私有化企业为纯公共企业时社会福利达到最大,企业国内控股比例的增加将增大最优社会福利;生产互补性产品的企业在价格竞争下,实行国有企业公司制股份制改革时社会福利达到最大,并且国内控股比例的增加将降低最佳私有化程度,社会福利最大化下政府要鼓励产品多样化和减少国外资金的渗透。从整个社会和企业角度看,国有企业股份制改革策略为最佳策略。
Since the beginning of the reform and opening in 1978, China has implemented company type joint-stock reform of state-owned firms, private firm. Joint venture enterprises continuously increase, and promote the rapid economic development in our country. In September, 2015, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council issued ＂Guidelines on Deepening the Reform of Slate Enterprises＂, pointing out that there still exist some problems for state-owned enterprises to be solved, to deepen the reform of state-owned enterprises. At the same time, attracting foreign investment actively has become one of the important development strategies in developing countries. Advanced production technol- ogy can be introduced through the penetration of foreign investment, which is conducive to the develop- ment of firms and the improvement of the production rate of domestic firms indirectly. Therefore, studying the degree of privatization of public firms, the foreign penetration of joint venture is of great significance to the firms and social development. Considering the factors such as the product differentiation of firms, the degree of privatization and foreign penetration,the relationship among the degree of privatization, foreign penetration and social welfare is researched, and the impact of the degree of privatization and foreign pene- tration on the mixed duopoly market under Bertrand competition is analyzed. A mixed duopoly model ofBertrand competition is first established, and the Bertrand equilibrium solution is obtained, then the opti- ma[ degrees of privatization respectively for substitutes and complementary goods under government＇s so- cial welfare maximization are derived. Furthermore, the impact of foreign penetration or domestic stock- holding of joint venture on the degree of privatization and the mixed duopoly market is analyzed. The re- suits show that, while the firms producing substitution goods compete in prices, the degree of privatization is reduced to zero, which means tha
出处
《中国管理科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第11期11-18,共8页
Chinese Journal of Management Science
基金
国家科技部创新方法工作专项项目(2013IM030600)
国家科技部支撑计划项目(2012BAH29F01)
江苏省软科学研究计划项目(BR2014095)
