摘要
通过一个信息非对称的差异化寡头竞争模型,比较了掌握私有信息的知情企业在披露和不披露两种策略下的收益,在此基础上进一步分析行业竞争水平、披露成本两个重要因素对企业最优自愿性信息披露决策的影响。结果表明:披露成本不为零时,知情企业只会对外披露其掌握的较"好"的那部分私有信息;自愿披露的数量与披露成本、行业竞争水平负相关,但与私有信息是关于市场需求的还是关于生产成本的无关。因此得出结论:其一,披露成本不为零是行业竞争水平与自愿披露数量负相关的前提;其二,对文献中竞争水平与披露数量间关系的成立范围有进一步拓展:私有信息不仅可以是行业层面的(市场需求),还可以是企业层面的(生产成本)。由于已有研究认为竞争水平与披露精度正相关,还表明有必要将披露数量与精度分开进行考察。
Using a model of differentiated duopoly in which asymmetric information between two firms is considered, this paper shows the resulting revenues of the informed firm which possesses private information a- bout uncertain market demand or production cost while he is making the decision of disclosing those information or not. A further analysis of how tense of intra-industry competition and disclosure cost affect the informed firm＇s optimal strategy is then carried out. The findings show that： （ 1 ） an informed firm usually reveals its private information partially when disclosure cost exists ; （2） the quantity of disclosure is negative related to tense of competition between firms, and is also negatively related to the cost of disclosure, but is unrelated to the type of the private information. The first finding shows the precondition under which increase of competition will lead to decrease of disclosure; the second expands the range the negative relationship between level of competition and quantity of voluntary disclosure and shows the relationship holds no matter the type of private information is about uncertain market demand or about uncertain production cost; it also shows that quantity and precision should be considered separately.
出处
《昆明理工大学学报（社会科学版）》
2017年第5期63-72,共10页
Journal of Kunming University of Science and Technology(Social Sciences)
基金
国家社会科学基金项目"中国证券市场隐性交易成本测算以及市场运行绩效评估研究"(15BJY165)
关键词
竞争水平
自愿披露
充分披露定理
披露成本
专有成本
tense of competition, voluntary disclosure, unraveling results, disclosure cost, proprietary cost
