摘要
本文利用2006-2015年中国上市公司数据,实证检验了不同所有权性质的企业,教授背景独立董事对高管变更业绩敏感性之间关系的差异,并检验了教授独立董事的"颜值"对高管变更业绩敏感性的影响。实证结果发现,教授独立董事可以增加高管在企业业绩较差的情况下变更的可能性,而"颜值"较高的教授独立董事可以减弱高管在企业业绩较差的情况下变更的可能性。另外,由于国有企业和民营企业不同的目标函数,使这种关系在国有企业更为明显。进一步研究发现,这种关系在企业聘用211高校的教授作为独立董事时仍然成立。这说明不同教授独立董事在不同环境下对于公司治理有着不同的作用,本文说明了独立董事制度作为外部治理机制的重要性,也证明了部分"花瓶"教授独立董事的存在。
Using a data set of Chinese listed companies from 2006 to 2015, this research investigates the relationship between independent director of professors and executive turnover in different corporate ownership. The results show that independent director of professors can reduce the executives’ turnover-performance sensitivity. Also, the results show that the high“Face Score” independent director of professors can increase the executives’ turnover-performance sensitivity. We accrual this result only exist in state owned companies. The independent director of professors plays an important role in corporate governance, the conclusion of this study will help people more clearly understand the importance of independent directors, and it also proves the existence of the independent director of the “vase”.
出处
《上海金融学院学报》
2016年第4期79-86,共8页
Journal of Shanhai Finance University
关键词
教授独立董事
“颜值”
企业所有权
高管变更
Independent Directors
“Face Score”
Corporate ownership
Executive Turnover
