摘要
文章以2013-2017年A股制造业上市公司为研究样本,运用回归分析检验了多个大股东对创新投资的影响,以及独立董事对多个大股东与创新投资的调节作用.实证结果表明,多个大股东共存抑制了企业创新投资,验证了"过度监督"和内斗的假说;独立董事年龄、技术型独立董事和学术型独立董事对多个大股东与创新投资有显著的调节作用.在此基础上进一步研究发现,产权性质的不同和不同类型的多个大股东会使得上述结论存在差别.因此,企业应注重股权结构的合理化,必要时可以通过引入独立董事和机构投资者持股来促进企业创新投资.本文不仅细化丰富了相关创新投资的研究文献,并对现实中如何改善公司治理,提高创新水平提供了经验与启示.
The data of Chinese manufacturing listed companies of A-share during 2013-2017 are analyzed as samples with regression analysis to examine the impact of multiple major shareholders on an enterprise's innovation investment and the role of the independent director in regulating major shareholders and innovation investments.The empirical results show that the coexistence of multiple major shareholders inhibits an enterprise from innovation investment,validating the hypothesis that multiple shareholders lead to"over-supervision"and internal discord;senior independent directors,or technical independent directors or academic independent directors have a significant role in regulating multiple major shareholders and the investment in innovation.Further research finds that the above conclusions can be different if the nature of property rights of the enterprise is different or multiple major shareholders fall into different types.Therefore,enterprises should try to keep a rational stockholding structure.If necessary,an independent director or institutional investors can be introduced to promote the innovation investment.This study not only refines the research literature on innovation investment,but also provides experience and inspirations on how to improve corporate governance and innovation in practice.
作者
杨雨晴
陈振凤
YANG Yu-qing;CHEN Zhen-feng(University of Jinan,Jinan,Shandong,250002,China)
出处
《武汉商学院学报》
2020年第3期49-56,共8页
Journal of Wuhan Business University
基金
国家社会科学基金项目《我国反倾销反补贴政策实施对企业行为的影响及其效果评价研究》(项目编号:14BGL120)
关键词
多个大股东
创新投资
独立董事
产权性质
机构投资者
multiple major shareholders
investment in innovations,independent director
property rights
institutional investors
