摘要
现有的上市公司董事会存在独立性不强、运作效率低、缺乏有效的制约和考评激励机制等诸多问题。在董事会的监督效率和董事会决策绩效的约束条件下,通过构建模型采用比较研究方法,分析相对集中的股权结构和多个大股东相互制衡性股权结构对中国上市公司董事会制度的影响。大股东相互制衡的股权结构使董事会成员间相互制衡,有利于提高董事会监督效率和决策绩效,是中国公司治理中董事会制度创新的方向。
At present,the board of listed companies has some problems such as lack of independence,low operation efficiency and lack of effective incentive system.Under the conditions of the supervised efficiency and decision-making performance of the board,by building the model of economic mathematics and the comparative method to analyze the influence of different shareholder structures on board system of Chinese listed companies,the writer of this paper concludes that the ownership restriction can promote the supervised efficiency and enhance decision-making performance of the board.The power balance with shareholder structure is the direction of board systems innovation the writer concludes.
出处
《西北大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》
CSSCI
北大核心
2011年第5期89-93,共5页
Journal of Northwest University：Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition
基金
陕西省软科学基金项目(2010KRM37)
关键词
股权制衡
董事会
制度创新
power balance with shareholder structure
board
systems innovation
