摘要
如何使独立董事更好地发挥监督治理作用一直是公司治理的核心问题,但以往文献通常从独立董事的个人异质性特征研究其监督效果,而较少关注独立董事在董事会中的地位及其治理效应。基于此,本文以独立董事在董事会名单中的排序衡量其地位,并从国有企业高管薪酬的视角检验了独立董事地位的治理效应。利用中国A股国有控股上市公司2004~2017年的10 299个年度观察数据,本文研究发现,独立董事在董事会中的地位越高,高管薪酬业绩敏感性越低,且这种负向影响关系在垄断行业国有企业和政府补助多的国有企业中表现得更为明显。进一步研究发现,国有企业高管的超额薪酬只与企业"运气"业绩相关,而地位较高的独立董事不仅降低了高管超额薪酬,还降低了高管超额薪酬与"运气"业绩之间的敏感性。这些结果表明,独立董事在董事会中拥有较高的地位能够提升其监督效果,不仅缓解了国企高管获取超额薪酬的代理行为,还约束了高管利用与其自身能力和努力无关的"运气"业绩为自身超额薪酬辩护的行为。本文的研究工作不仅丰富了独立董事治理和国有企业高管薪酬的相关文献,而且对指导独立董事制度改革和国有企业高管薪酬制度改革的实践活动都具有重要的政策启示。
The role of independent directors in corporate governance has been instrumental for the monitoring performance of the board of directors.Nevertheless,prior research almost exclusively focuses on the relation between heterogeneous personal attributes of independent directors and monitoring performance,and little attention has been paid to the relation between the status of independent directors and monitoring performance.Using the rankings of independent directors in the list of members of the board as a measure of independent directors,we examine the relation between the status of independent directors and executive compensation in state-owned enterprises(SOEs).We carry out the tests with an annual panel dataset of Chinese A-share listed SOEs from 2004 to 2017,and the dataset has 10,299 annual observations.Our results show that the high status of independent directors is associated with a low compensation-performance sensitivity,and the negative association is stronger for SOEs in monopolistic industries and for SOEs receiving more government subsidies.Further analysis reveals that excess executive compensation can be attributed to the lucky component of corporate performance and that independent directors with the high status reduce not only excess executive compensation but also the sensitivity of excess executive compensation to the lucky component of corporate performance.These results show that independent directors with the high status can improve corporate governance in that the board with them not only alleviates the agency problem of excess executive compensation but also restricts the executives’opportunistic behavior of using corporate performance unrelated to their own efforts to obtain excess compensation.Overall,the paper not only extends the literature on the governance effect of independent directors and the literature on the executive compensation in SOEs,but also provides important policy implications for guiding reforms in the regulations for independent directors and for executive compensati
作者
罗进辉
李佳霖
向元高
Jinhui Luo;Jialin Li;Yuangao Xiang(Center for Accounting Studies of Xiamen University,Xiamen,Fujian,China 361005;School of Management,Xiamen University,Xiamen,Fujian,China 361005;Institute for Financial&Accounting Studies,Xiamen University,Xiamen,Fujian,China 361005)
出处
《当代会计评论》
2021年第3期75-109,共35页
Contemporary Accounting Review
基金
国家自然科学基金面上项目“上市公司聘请社会名人和退休官员担任独立董事的动机与后果”(71572160)
国家自然科学基金重大项目“制度变革、非正式制度因素与会计审计行为研究”(71790602)的资助
关键词
独立董事地位
高管薪酬
国有企业
薪酬业绩敏感性超额
薪酬
Independent director status
executive compensation
state-owned enterprises
compensation-performance sensitivity
excess executive compensation
