摘要
研究了一个强势的供应商和一个弱势的批发商在最优生产量和最优订货量方面的讨价还价问题.建立了完全信息和不对称信息下批发商与供应商的讨价还价模型,得到了上述两种情况下批发商的讨价还价最优解,并据此给出了讨价还价最优解下批发商应给予供应商的最少支付以及批发商的信息价值.通过数值分析讨论了完全信息下一些重要参数对批发商的最优决策,最小成本和给予供应商的最小支付的影响,以及不对称信息下对批发商最优方案设计的影响.进一步的研究发现,弱势的批发商通过讨价还价可以减少成本和实现供应链协调.
This paper discussed a bargaining problem between an advantaged supplier and a disadvantaged wholesale in the case of optimal production quantity and optimal order quantity. Two bargaining models were established for the supplier and the wholesaler under the condition of complete information and asymmetric information. The optimal solution of bargaining for the wholesaler in the above two cases was attained. Ac- cording to that, the least paying that the wholesaler should pay for the supplier and the information value of the wholesaler under the bargaining optimal solution were suggested. On the analysis of the values, the best decision of some important values for the wholesaler in complete information and the minimum cost and im- pacts of giving the supplier the minimum payments were discussed, as well as the impacts on the wholesaler＇s optimal design plan. Further the research found that the cost could be reduced for the disadvantaged wholesaler so as to achieve the coordination of supply chain by bargaining.
出处
《系统工程学报》
CSCD
北大核心
2016年第4期481-493,共13页
Journal of Systems Engineering
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71272085)
教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金资助项目(12YJA630135)
关键词
供应链管理
最优策略
讨价还价
不对称信息
supply chain management
optimal strategy
bargaining
asymmetric information
