摘要
在供应商面临资金约束的供应链中,通过零售商提前订购部分产品并支付货款的内部预订融资模式,与零售商为供应商提供担保向银行借款的外部信贷融资模式,可以缓解供应商的资金约束对零售商及供应链利润的影响,研究了两种模式下供应商和零售商的最优生产决策和融资决策,并分析了供应商的自有资金、零售商的资金成本、银行利率三种因素对于供应链融资绩效的影响。结果表明:两种融资模式要实现无资金约束下的最优生产量,都需要供应商拥有一定的初始资金,所需初始资金量的多少与各自的融资成本有关。所得的结论为供应链企业选择合适的融资方式和最优生产决策提供指导。最后通过数值分析对结论进行了验证。
One of key challenges faced by many start-up and fast-growing suppliers is to finance their operations. Start-up or fast- growing suppliers often have difficulty in borrowing money from banks because they have few fixed assets. This capital constraint keeps these suppliers from engaging in substantial production for their retailers, and increases the chance of supply shortage. The retailers have the incentive to relieve their suppliers from capital burden and boost their production. A supply chain consists of one supplier and one retailer with uncertain demand. The retailer has ample capital, but the supplier is under capital constraints. The supplier produces in anticipation of the retailer＇s orders. The retailer can procure from the supplier in a pull mode based on observed actual demand. We consider two different modes of financing the supplier： internal preorder financing mode and external credit financing mode. In the first part, we study the internalpreorder financing mode. Under this mode, the retailer is induced to place a firm order and pay the money before the supplier starts to produce. After observing actual demand, the retailer can place an additional order. Using the Stackelberg game, we analyze the retailer ＇ s optimal preorder quantity and the supplier＇s optimal production quantity for given initial capitals at the supplier and financial cost of the retailer. It is shown that if we want to bring the system＇s production to the optimal quantity without capital constraint, the supplier must have a certain initial capital in order to increase in the retailer＇s financial cost. In the second part, we study the externalcredit financing mode. Under this mode, the retailer offers a guarantee for the supplier＇s borrowing from a bank. If the supplier＇s sales revenue is smaller than the loan, the retailer repays the residual loan. Using the Stackelberg game, we analyze the retailer ＇ s optimal loan guarantee amount and the supplier＇s optimal production quantity for given initial capital
出处
《管理工程学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2013年第1期178-184,共7页
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71072063)
国家自然科学基金青年资助项目(71001063)
上海交通大学研究生创新能力培养专项基金资助项目
关键词
供应链管理
资金约束
预订融资
信贷融资
supply chain management
capital constraint
preorder financing
credit financing
