摘要
2013年完成的公司资本制度变革,在不设最低资本额要求、允许股东自行约定出资期限、设立登记不要求提交验资证明等方面颇为激进,对债权人保护则嫌考虑不周,具体体现:认缴资本登记与实缴资本公示双轨化,债权人存在信息真空;缺乏催缴机制,股东任性认缴资本虚增市场信用;"两虚一逃"除罪化,违规减资道德风险大幅提升。在现实生活中,利用认缴登记与实缴公示之间的时间差以诈欺债权人的案例多有发生。鉴此,建议借鉴英美国家的做法,增设资本催缴制度安排,创建以债权人同意为基础的法院确认减资机制,引入标注"减资"的安排以及时提示交易风险;确立股东的后减资义务,弱化公司的机会主义动机;引入封闭公司的偿债能力声明机制,以高管的信用担保作为法院确认减资程序的替代性安排。
The Revised Company Law 2013 eliminated the minimum capital requirements, permitted shareholders to contract around contribution period and abolished the capital verification rule, thus provoking an aggressive profile while weakening the considerations on the creditors＇ protection. The time lag between the registration on the subscribed capital and the pub- licity on the paid-off capital, the lack of capital call-up institution and decriminalization on capital contribution triggered the moral hazards of frauds on creditors, which have been indicated by increasing litigations. In light of this, we should initiate the legal reforms, which include establishing capital call-up institution, creating capital-reduction mechanism based on creditors assent and court＇s confirm, clearly indicating capital-reduction and introducing the solvency statement institution, etc.
出处
《法学评论》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第4期139-147,共9页
Law Review
关键词
认缴登记
实缴公示
资本催缴
法院确认减资
偿债能力声明
Registration on Capital Subscription
Publicity on Paid-off Capital
Call-up Capital
Capital Reduction Based on Court＇s Confirm
Solvency Statement
