摘要
在PPP项目风险分担及实物期权理论的基础上,将政府部门的互惠偏好以及项目参与方的风险偏好加入博弈模型,分别讨论两阶段和三阶段讨价还价博弈模型如何实现期权价值分配,并对比两种博弈模型得出的结论。通过数值分析得出:只有当政府的互惠偏好程度高于一定值时才能实现有效的激励效用。
Based on risk-sharing and real option theory of PPP projects,this paper combines two parameters which are reciprocal preferences of government departments and risk preferences of project participants into the game model,discusses the allocations of real option value by two-stage and three-stage game models,also compares the conclusions. According to numerical analysis,government reciprocity level should be higher enough to achieve effective incentive effects.
出处
《建筑经济》
2016年第7期54-57,共4页
Construction Economy
基金
国家自然科学基金(71571149)
福建省中青年教师教育科研项目(JAS150243)
关键词
PPP项目
实物期权
风险偏好
互惠偏好
PPP project
real option
risk preferences
reciprocal preferences
