摘要
本文以2006—2014年A股上市公司为研究样本,分析了高管薪酬与企业被ST处理的关系和对摆脱ST的影响。本文研究发现,上市公司被ST处理和被ST处理后的"摘帽"快慢与公司高管的薪酬显著相关。高管现金薪酬低、高管持股比例低的企业更有可能被ST处理。被ST处理后,高管持股比例低的企业,"摘帽"需要的时间更长;相对于民营企业,国有企业高管持股水平对摆脱ST的治理作用更明显。本文的研究结论对优化企业薪酬制度和深化上市公司治理改革具有积极的启示作用。
This paper investigates the relationship between executive compensation and firm performance in ST companies from 2006 to 2014. We try to find out how executive compensation affect the ST（ special treatment）performance,i, e. Can high pay reduce the risk of being Special Treated？ Does executive compensation has any influence on the time,by which the firms get rid of being Special Treated？ We find that executive compensations do have significant influence on the performance of ST. Consistent with agency theory, there is a pay-for-performance link. We also find that the higher the shareholding ratio of managers, the faster the ST firms will get rid of being Special Treated. Further investigation also shows that there are some differences between State Owned Enterprise（SOEs） and non-SOEs.
出处
《中国软科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第5期79-92,共14页
China Soft Science
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(批准号:71472040)
关键词
ST企业
高管薪酬
企业业绩
ST finns
executive compensation
firm performance
