摘要
文章以国有企业的舞弊活动为研究视角,考察了政府分权的经济后果。理论上,政府分权会减轻企业的政治成本,降低企业的舞弊概率;但同时政府分权也会加剧代理成本(管理层自利行为的成本),提高企业的舞弊概率。以金字塔层级作为政府对国有企业分权程度的替代变量,实证结果显示,政府分权显著降低了国有企业的舞弊概率。对舞弊类型细分之后发现,政府分权主要降低了企业信息披露与资本市场交易方面的舞弊。此外,政府分权对企业舞弊的抑制作用主要存在于政府干预动机较强的地区。本文的结论从企业舞弊的视角支持了政府对国有企业的分权化改革。
This paper investigates the economic consequence of government decentralization to state-owned enterprises( SOEs) from the perspective of corporate fraud. Theoretically,decentralization can reduce political costs and decrease SOEs' probability of fraud. At the same time,decentralization can reinforce agency problem and increase SOEs' probability of fraud. Our empirical results show that decentralization significantly decreases the SOEs' probability of fraud. After identifying types of corporate frauds,we find that decentralization mainly decreases frauds relevant to information disclosures and capital market transactions. In addition,the effect ofdecentralization on corporate fraud mainly exists in firms that are more likely to be influenced by the government.Conclusions of our paper support governments' decentralization policy from the aspect of corporate fraud.
出处
《会计研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第4期34-41,95,共8页
Accounting Research
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71402017)
国家自然科学基金项目(71503283)
辽宁高等学校优秀人才支持计划(WJQ2014035)的资助
教育部人文社会科学研究基金项目(14YJC630069)等的资助
