摘要
大量实验研究显示,被罚者能够立即"可知的"利他惩罚可以有效地维系公共品自愿供给合作,这是破解社会合作难题的突破口。但近年来,这种实验设计招致诸多质疑。本文重新审视了人们的利他惩罚意愿,分析了人们对他人的利他惩罚预期及其对社会合作的影响。研究发现,更为严格意义上的利他惩罚确实存在,但利他惩罚威胁不足以维系社会合作,搭便车者往往会低估他人的利他惩罚。基于当前中国社会的利他惩罚乏力、利他惩罚预期不足的基本判断,本文提出,应积极拓展利他惩罚渠道、畅通惩罚作用路径,在私人惩罚与公共惩罚的互动中,形成有力的失信惩戒机制,从而进一步强化利他惩罚对违规、卸责、搭便车等机会主义行为的威慑。这是当前推进社会治理的一个有效抓手。
As an informal social control method, altruistic punishment becomes a key to solve the puzzle of social cooperation and to innovate the way of social governance. Based on the economic experiments, this paper discusses the enhancing effects on public goods voluntary contribution of the threat of peer punishment. It finds that altruistic punishment aimed at free rider is prevailing even when the punishment is unobserved, and anti-social punishment should not be neglected. However, the willingness to punish the peers is weaker in the experiments where the punishment is unobserved than that where the punishment is observed. It also finds that peer punishment could not sustain public goods cooperation in experiment subject with Chinese college students when the punishment is unobserved. The conclusion contradicts with that with American college students. This paper not only provides new evidences with Chinese subjects, hut also supports to perfect the public goods provision theory in China.
出处
《财贸经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第3期45-59,共15页
Finance & Trade Economics
基金
国家社会科学基金重大招标项目"中国与周边国家电力互联互通战略研究"(13&ZD168)
国家社会科学基金一般项目"地方政府社会治理创新对公共服务的影响研究"(14BGL148)
"农民工市民化背景下的社会保障制度改革研究"(15BSH047)
关键词
利他惩罚
预期
公共品实验
社会治理
Altruistic Punishment, Belief, Public Goods Experiment, Social Governance
