摘要
本文通过构建实验室实验引入现实社会中常见的淘汰式惩罚机制,探究该机制对团队合作行为的影响。在引入淘汰式惩罚机制的重复公共品博弈中,每位团队成员均能观察到其他成员每轮对公共品的贡献,且每4轮获得一次永久性淘汰其他成员的投票权利。当某成员被不少于半数的其他成员投淘汰票后会被逐出团队,意味着其将不能再参加后续博弈轮次并获得收益。研究表明,各团队均有成员使用该惩罚机制淘汰其他团队成员,从而在重复合作过程中不断提高团队的人均贡献并将其维持在较高水平。成员的个人贡献低于团队人均贡献的相对程度越大,其被惩罚的概率就越大。贡献高于团队人均水平的成员比贡献低于人均水平的成员更愿意实施惩罚。在撤掉该惩罚机制后,之前形成的高水平合作未能继续维持。
This study experimentally investigates the impacts of the mechanism of exclusive punishment on team cooperation behavior.Using a repeated public good game,each team member s contribution to the public good is a common knowledge after each round and each member can vote to exclude other member(s)from the team permanently after every four rounds.The members who are voted to be excluded by no less than half of the members are excluded and unable to play the subsequent rounds and receive payoffs from these rounds.We find that members use this mechanism to exclude other members,which gradually increases and maintains average cooperation.The lower the contribution from a team member,the more likely he/she is punished.Members with contribution above the average are more likely to punish others than those who contribute below the average.However,high level contrition will diminish after removing the penalty mechanism.
作者
何浩然
夏静文
关雯琦
林斌斌
He Haoran;Xia Jingwen;Guan Wenqi;Lin Binbin
出处
《世界经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2020年第3期46-68,共23页
The Journal of World Economy
基金
教育部人文社会科学研究基金(18YJA790032)
北京市自然科学基金(9192013)
国家自然科学基金(71973016)的资助。
关键词
淘汰
惩罚
合作
公共品博弈
实验
exclusion
punishment
cooperation
public good
experiment
