摘要
有效的公司治理机制不但能够在公司业绩低劣时及时解聘不称职的经理人员,并且能够选聘称职的经理人员予以替代。根据这一逻辑,本文利用我国1998～2006年上市公司的数据对我国高管更换与董事会特征、经营业绩之间的关系进行实证研究,以分析我国公司内部治理机制的有效性。回归结果表明,我国上市公司高层管理者的变更概率随公司经营业绩的下降而提高,但上市公司的经营业绩却没有在更换经理后得到显著的改善。对我国上市公司董事会的研究结果表明,在我国,董事会的规模对董事会效率基本没有显著的影响,而董事会领导权结构影响了董事会在高管更换中有效性的发挥,在两职合一的条件下,由于管理者"堑壕"的存在,董事会难以更换业绩不佳的高层管理者。独立董事制度在2003年之后逐渐起到了监督经理人的作用,独立董事的比例越高,董事会越有可能解聘不称职的经理,但这一指标对于高管更换后业绩的改善却没有显著的影响力。另外管理人员持股也没有起到提高公司业绩的作用。
An effective corporate governance is not only able to fire unqualified top manager timely but also able to choose and employ a better qualified successor.According to the logic,this paper uses data on China's listed firms from 1998 to 2006 to analyze the relation of turnover and boards' characteristics and performance to examine the effectiveness of internal corporate sys- tem.The empirical study on relation of turnover and performance demonstrates the turnover is sig- nificantly related to poor performance.The lower the performance,the higher the probability of the turnover.But it is disappointed that the performance was not improved after changing the top managers.The relation of turnover and board characteristics shows the size of boards is insignifi- cantly related to internal turnover.Leadership structure of boards significantly affects internal turn- over.Under the duality condition,it is difficult for boards to change the unfitted top manag- ers.The system of independent director has increasingly done its monitory work since 2003.The higher the ratio of independent director is,the higher the possibility of dismissing the unfitted top managers will be.But the indicator is irrelevant to the performance improvement.It also hasn't im- proved the companies' performance to have the managers holding stock shares.
出处
《产业经济评论（山东）》
CSSCI
2008年第4期105-123,共19页
Review of Industrial Economics
关键词
公司业绩
董事会特征
高管更换
Corporate Performance
Boards' Characteristics
Top Management Turnover
