摘要
本文从异质性风险的角度实证考察了我国上市公司经理人变更中存在的短期进取行为。研究发现,当面临被迫离职的威胁时,经理人倾向于通过额外的风险承担提升公司业绩,从而巩固自身地位,该现象在地方国有企业中尤其显著。这反映了我国上市公司业绩提升伴随着风险累积的现实。另外,本文发现总经理管理防御能力越强,企业异质性风险与总经理被迫离职的敏感度越强,经理人壕沟效应越明显。依据上述结论,本文提出了相应的政策建议。
This paper examines the short-term opportunistic behavior during the CEO forced turnover from the perspective of the firm＇s idiosyncratic risk. We find that facing the threat of forced turnover, the CEO tends to improve the firm＇s performance by taking extra risk so that the CEO position can be se- cured. This phenomenon is particularly significant in local state-owned firms. The results suggest that the economic growth of Chinese listed firms is accompanied with risk accumulation. In addition, this paper dis- covers that CEO entrenchment would strengthen the idiosyncratic-CEO forced turnover sensitivity. Finally, we put forward some according policy suggestions to the results.
出处
《经济理论与经济管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2014年第12期93-106,共14页
Economic Theory and Business Management
基金
新世纪优秀人才支持计划资助
关键词
被迫离职
异质性风险
系统性风险
公司治理
壕沟效应
forced turnover
idiosyncratic risk
systemic risk
corporate governance
entrenchment
